Technology independent honeynet description language by Fan, Wenjun et al.
Technology Independent Honeynet Description Language 
Wenjun Fan, David Fernández and Víctor A. Villagrá 
Departamento de Ingeniería de Sistemas Telemáticos, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, 
ETSI Telecomunicación, Avda. Complutense 30, 28040, Madrid, Spain 
{efan, david, villagra}@dit.upm.es 
Keywords: Honeynet Description Language, Honeynet Configuration, Honeynet Management, Network Security. 
Abstract: Several languages have been proposed for the task of describing networks of systems, either to help on 
managing, simulate or deploy testbeds for testing purposes. However, there is no one specifically designed 
to describe the honeynets, covering the specific characteristics in terms of applications and tools included in 
the honeypot systems that make the honeynet. In this paper, the requirements of honeynet description are 
studied and a survey of existing description languages is presented, concluding that a CIM (Common 
Information Model) match the basic requirements. Thus, a CIM like technology independent honeynet 
description language (TIHDL) is proposed. The language is defined being independent of the platform 
where the honeynet will be deployed later, and it can be translated, either using model-driven techniques or 
other translation mechanisms, into the description languages of honeynet deployment platforms and tools. 
This approach gives flexibility to allow the use of a combination of heterogeneous deployment platforms. 
Besides, a flexible virtual honeynet generation tool (HoneyGen) based on the approach and description 
language proposed and capable of deploying honeynets over VNX (Virtual Networks over LinuX) and 
Honeyd platforms is presented for validation purposes. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Honeypot is an important tool to analyze the 
adversary’s behaviour. The definition of honeypot is: 
A honeypot is an information system resource whose 
value lies in unauthorized or illicit use of that 
resource (Spitzner, L., 2003). A honeynet is a 
network of honeypots. A honeynet can consist of 
high-interaction honeypots or low-interaction 
honeypots or both of them. High-interaction 
honeypot is designed to capture extensive 
information on threats. Opposite to low-interaction 
honeypot which just emulates the operating systems 
and services, high-interaction provides real systems, 
application, and services to lure adversaries’ snoop 
and attack. Honeynet creates a highly controlled 
network, which system administrator can control, 
and monitor all activity that occurs inside it. 
However, one of the biggest challenges we face 
with most security technologies, including honeynet, 
is configuration. Especially for the dynamic 
honeynet (Spitzner, L., 2010), it is very important to 
reconfigure the honeynet when the network 
environment is changed. For example, a honeynet is 
deployed to clone a target network, if the target 
network changes its configuration, then the honeynet 
has to be reconfigured too. Another case in point is 
that the IRS (Intrusion Response System) can divert 
the intrusion traffic into the honeypots to do 
investigation. The intrusion traffics also can impact 
the network environment. Thus, one issue of IRS is 
to dynamically create and configure the honeypots. 
However, it is a complex task to create and 
configure the dynamic honeynet manually. Thus, it 
is necessary to use an automated honeynet tool to 
create, configure, and deploy the dynamic honeynet. 
Nevertheless, in this kind of automated honeynet 
tool we need a network description language to 
make the configuration of the honeynet. 
Network description language is used to describe 
the topology, configuration, and other information of 
a network. In the network security community, there 
isn’t a network description language against the 
network of honeypots. As we all know, honeypot 
can be established based on the physical device. 
However, with the advantages of virtualization 
technology, honeynet also can be installed in one 
host system. What’s more, virtual network is a built-
in feature of linux kernel, and many more virtual 
network tools, such as mininet, libvirt by linux 
bridge, openvswitch, etc. are available. Thus, it is 
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necessary to consider creating a flexible honeynet 
generation tool that can deploy honeynet over 
different platforms based on a technology 
independent honeynet description language. 
In this paper, a Common Information Model 
(http://dmtf.org/standards/cim) like technology 
independent honeynet description language  
(TIHDL) is proposed for describing the scenario of 
honeynet. Based on the TIHDL core, a honeynet 
request, configuration and management language is 
made. This language is used in a flexible virtual 
honeynet tool, which can comprise a combination of 
heterogeneous platforms for deploying honeynet and 
also can deploy hybrid honeynet that mixes the low-
interaction honeypots and high-interaction 
honeypots on one virtual network. 
The organization of this paper is as follows: in 
section 2, the technology independent honeynet 
description language is proposed; in section 3, the 
architecture of our system is demonstrated; in 
section 4, a proof of concept and the validation are 
made; in section 5, a conclusion is made, and some 
future work is proposed. 
2 HONEYNET DESCRIPTION 
LANGUAGE 
2.1 A Typical Honeynet 
In this part, one typical honeynet is presented. Using 
this typical honeynet, both the adversary’s and 
system administrator’s behavior are depicted. Figure 
1 shows the typical honeynet. There is an internal 
subnet that is protected by a firewall and a DMZ 
subnet that is used to deploy honeynet. In front of 
the honeynet there is a containment gateway. 
 
Figure 1: A typical honeynet. 
On one hand, from the adversaries’ perspective, 
several steps should be done to compromise a 
computer system. First, fingerprinting of the system 
is exposed by some scanning tools, e.g. Nmap 
(http://nmap.org/) and xprobe2 
(http://www.aldeid.com/wiki/Xprobe2). In this step, 
an intruder can collect the information of the name 
and version of the operating system, the IP address, 
the open TCP/UDP ports, and the service provided. 
Second, the intruder can search the available 
vulnerabilities of the target system according to the 
information of the first step. In the second step, 
Nessus (http://www.tenable.com/products/nessus) is 
always a good choice. Third, the intruder can use 
some tools, e.g. Metasploit 
(http://www.metasploit.com/), to exploit the target 
system. 
On the other hand, from the system 
administrator’s viewpoint, some protective measures 
must be put into effect. There is a containment 
gateway called Honeywall which is used to monitor 
the honeypots, detect the intrusion traffics, observe 
and record the adversaries’ behavior when they 
compromise the honeypots. At the same time, it also 
can restrict the outgoing traffics, which means the 
adversary is confined to compromise other system 
from the compromised honeypot. Honeywall is a 
gateway device that separates the honeypots from 
the rest of the world. Any traffic going to or from 
the honeypots must go through the Honeywall. This 
gateway is traditionally a layer 2 bridging/switching 
device, meaning the device should be invisible to 
anyone interacting with the honeypots. From the 
diagram, it can be observed that the honeywall has 3 
interfaces. The first 2 interfaces (eth0 and eth1) are 
what segregate the honeypots from everything else, 
and they are bridged interfaces that have no IP stack. 
The 3rd interface (eth2, which is optional) has an IP 
stack allowing for remote administration. 
2.2 The Requirement of Honeynet 
Description 
Table 1: The characteristics for honeynet description. 
Network 
Application Layer Protocol Service 
Transport Layer TCP/UDP port 
Network Layer 
IP address 
IP Routing Topology 
Data Link Layer Network Interface  Mac Address 
Physical Layer Device Type 
System Operating System 
Name and Version of 
Operating System 
Name and Version of 
Software Installed 
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From both the adversary’s and administrator’s point 
of view, the characteristics that must be considered 
for honeynet description are figured out. The 
characteristics that have to be used for honeynet 
description are listed in Table 1. We classify them 
from the angles of the network TCP/IP stacks and 
the operating system. 
We can view this table from bottom to top. The 
first two characteristics are the name and version of 
the operating system and the installed software. 
These two parameters are important for OS and 
software that always have the vulnerabilities unless 
they have been patched. Fingerprinting tool can 
easily detect the OS information that consists of 
name and version, after that adversary can exploit 
the vulnerability. Admittedly, system can be updated 
and patched in time. However, the 0day exploits can 
compromise the system before it gets patched. The 
third characteristic is the device type, because in a 
typical honeynet, there are different devices such as 
router, containment gateway and honeypot system. 
They should be identified clearly. Furthermore, the 
Mac address is used to identify every network 
interface on the devices. However, some interfaces 
do not have IP stack but they are linked with other 
interfaces, thus we need the network interface link to 
describe this sort of relationship. Moreover, we must 
know the IP address of each system, and the routing 
topology. The adversary needs them to find a target 
system to compromise, and the system administrator 
needs them to deploy the honeynet. In addition, the 
systems on internal network always provide services, 
which always bind ports. As we all know, one 
particular attack or misconfiguration always aims at 
one kind of service. The adversary can use the 
vulnerabilities of service to compromise the system. 
Thus, another parameter is the sort of service. There 
are several services can be deployed on server, such 
as Web service, FTP service, DNS service, Mail 
service, VoIP service, etc. Besides, a provided 
service is always combined to an open port. Thus, 
the last two characteristics are the open port and the 
service. 
All in all, these nine characteristics are only the 
basic requisite for typical honeynet description.  The 
desired honeynet description has to be able to 
describe these nine characteristics at least. 
2.3 A Survey of Existing Network 
Description Languages 
Even though, there are some description languages, 
which can be used to describe either networks or 
systems. For example, ns-3 (http://www.nsnam.org/), 
a network simulator, provides a complete language 
for simulating network, and SysML 
(http://www.omgsysml.org/), the System Modeling 
Language, offers a flexible and expressive language 
for system engineering. However, security issues 
always makes up of network security and computer 
system security. Thus, for honeynet description, it is 
necessary to elect a language that describes both 
network and system. Now that the requirement items 
for honeynet description are proposed. We can use 
them to study the existing network description 
languages. We investigated ten network description 
languages. They are YANG (Bjorklun, M., 2010), 
NDL (Grosso, P., et al., 2007), NML (Ham, J.J. van 
der, et al., 2013),  INDL  (Ghijsen,  M., et al.,  2012), 
Table 2: A survey of existing network description languages for honeynet description. 







VXDL BNF style template 
language of Honeyd 




Device Type + + + + O + + + 
Mac address - O - O + + O O 
Network interface 
Link 
- + + + - + + - 
IP address + O - O + + + + 
IP routing topology O - - - + + O + 
Transport layer port + - - - + + - - 
Application  O - O + - + O + 
Service O - O O O + + + 
Name and version of 
Software installed 
O - - + - + O + 
Name and version of 
operating system 
O - + + + + + + 
Legend: “+” means “available”; “O” indicates “limited available”; “-” represents “not available” 
Languages 
Requirements 
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NDML+ (Luntovskyy, A., et al., 2008), VXDL 
(Koslovski, G. P., et al., 2009), Template language 
of Honeyd (Provos, N., 2004), CIM, Rspec of SFA 
(http://www.protogeni.net/trac/protogeni/wiki/RSpe
c) and Glue 2.0 (Andreozzi, S. et al., 2009). 
The result of the survey of the existing network 
description languages are demonstrated in Table 2. 
From the survey of these existing languages, it is 
apparent that CIM is the best choice for honeynet 
description. However, CIM only meets the basic 
requisite for honeynet description, and it lacks some 
other useful information, e.g. the level of interaction 
of honeypot. Furthermore, CIM is not a 
configuration language. So it can’t be adopt directly 
to configure the scenario of honeynet. Several 
characteristics of configuration have to be provided 
in the desired language. Thus, the best way is to 
create a new CIM like technology independent 
honeynet description language. 
3 HoneyGen 
In this section, a flexible virtual honeynet generation 
tool (HoneyGen) is presented. The architecture of 
HoneyGen is shown in Fig. 2. Through the whole 
HoneyGen architecture, the main components are 
the request processor, the configuration engine, the 
catalog of honeynet template, the specific translation 
module and the deployment tools. Besides, the 
request description, TIHDL and the development 
tool configuration are employed separately in each 
step for the honeynet scenario generation. 
3.1 The XML Syntax of TIHDL 
Figure 3 is the core of TIHDL. This core includes 12 
classes and 11 associations. All of the associations 
are totally employed from the corresponding CIM 
models. Some classes are immediately adopted from 
the corresponding CIM models, such as the class 
ComputerSystem, OperatingSystem, Software, 
Service, and ProtocolService. Some classes inherit 
from the corresponding CIM classes, e.g. the class 
NetworkInterface inherits from the CIM class 
NetworkPort, the class Net inherits from the CIM 
class ConnectivityCollection, and the class 
Honeynet inherits from the CIM class Network. At 
last, the other three classes ContainmentGateway, 
Router and Honeypot are proposed by TIHDL and 
inherit from the CIM class ComputerSystem. 
 
Figure 2: The architecture of HoneyGen. 
 
Figure 3: The core of TIHDL. 
Based on the core of TIHDL, a honeynet request, 
configuration and management language schema 
using XML syntax is made. The XML schema of 
CIM isn’t adopted for several reasons. First, the 
XML schema of CIM is complex and not easy to 
know well for the users who are not familiar with 
CIM. Second, many elements of XML schema of 
CIM is redundant for honeynet description, but it 
lacks some requisite elements, e.g. the level of 
interaction. Third, it is not convenient to use the 
XML schema of CIM to describe the scenario when 
the users make a request. For example, the users 
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even have to describe every association. Forth, it is 
also need to add some more attributes for request 
and reconfiguration in the XML schema. An 
example of honeynet scenario based on the XML 
















   <name>r1</name> 
   <if id=“1” net=“net0” > 
        <name>eth0</name> 
        <mac_addr>00:00:00:ee:db:11</mac_addr> 
        <ipv4>192.168.1.10/24</ipv4> 
</if> 
<if id=“2” net=“net1” > 
        <name>eth1</name> 
        <mac_addr>00:00:00:ee:db:12</mac_addr> 
        <ipv4>10.1.0.1/24</ipv4> 
</if> 
<if id=“3” net=“net2” > 
        <name>eth2</name> 
        <mac_addr>00:00:00:ee:db:13</mac_addr> 
        <ipv4>10.2.0.1/24</ipv4> 
</if> 
<route id=“1”> 
       <dst>default</dst> 
       <gw>192.168.1.1</gw> 
</route> 
<operating_system> 
           <name>ubuntu</name> 





<if id=“1” net=“net1” > 
    <name>eth0</name> 
              <mac_addr>00:00:00:ee:db:14</mac_addr> 
</if> 
<if id=“2” net=“net3” > 
    <name>eth1</name> 
    <mac_addr>00:00:00:ee:db:15</mac_addr> 
</if> 
<if id=“3” net=“net2” > 
    <name>eth2</name> 
    <mac_addr>00:00:00:ee:db:16</mac_addr> 
    <ipv4>10.2.0.2/24</ipv4> 
</if> 
<operating_system> 
           <name>Roo</name> 




    <name> pc1</name> 
    <interaction_level>high</interaction_level> 
    <if id=“1” net=“net3”> 
        <name>ethernet adapter</name> 
        <mac_addr>00:00:00:ee:db:17</mac_addr> 
        <ipv4>10.1.0.2/24</ipv4> 
</if> 
    <operating_system> 
         <name>Windows XP professional</name> 
         <version>sp2</version> 
    </operating_system> 
    <software id=“1”> 
           <name>FoxMail</name> 
           <version>5.0</version> 
    </software> 
</honeynet> 
This technology independent honeynet 
description has 4 nets, 1 router, 1 
containmentgateway and 1 honeypot. HoneyGen has 
its own configuration file where the user can specify 
some platform related parameters, i.e. set Honeyd as 
the low interaction honeypot, indicate KVM based 
virtual machine as the high interaction and specify 
the Honeywall as the containmentgateway. In this 
description, the containmentgateway is a Honeywall, 
so it has one layer 3 interface and two layer 2 
interfaces. The honeypot namely pc1 is installed 
Windows XP professional Sp2. The pc1 is also 
installed a software called FoxMail5.0, which has 
the buffer overflow vulnerability. 
3.2 Catalog of Honeynet Template 
The catalog of honeynet template is preset as a 
repository in this system. The TIHDL is used to 
describe the honeynet template. The name of the 
template file represents the template name in the 
repository. 
3.3 Request Processor 
The request processor is the trigger of HoneyGen. It 
provides an API that allows the user to call for 
honeynet scenario. When it receives a request, it will 
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check the request syntax and the values of the 
elements. If everything is correct, it will activate the 
tool to generate the honeynet on demand. The 
request processor provides a flexible rule to receive 
the honeynet request. First, it can accept the request 
that describes every honeypot system and all of the 
values of the elements. Second, it also can accept the 
request that only provides a template name. 
3.4 Configuration Engine 
Configuration Engine is used to process the request 
from request processor. If the request only provides 
a template name, it will search the template in the 
repository according to the template name and then 
produce the configuration file. What’s more 
important, our configuration engine can reconfigure 
the configuration of the honeynet on the fly. All of 
the elements (e.g. net, router, honeypot, if) with 
complex type in the XML schema have an attribute 
called “request”, which can be set to four values: 
create, add, del and set. If the user wants to modify 
the configuration, the attribute “request” must be 
specified. 
3.5 Transformation Module 
The general configuration file cannot be used to 
deploy honeypots, but it can be translated to be a 
specific configuration file that can be recognized by 
the specific deployment tools. Thus, transformation 
module is developed to take this responsibility. In 
our tool, Honeyd and VNX (Fernandez, D., et al., 
2011) are elected as the deployment tools to take the 
responsibilities of deploying low-interaction 
honeypots and high-interaction honeypots. The 
configuration of VNX scenario is based on XML 
syntax, thus it does not need to do any syntax change. 
However, the Honeyd template language is BNF 
(Backus–Naur Form) based, and the Honeyd 
configuration template is text based. So, the 
transformation module of Honeyd must map the 
general XML based configuration file to the text 
based Honeyd configuration template. 
3.6 Deployment Tools 
As we all know that there are many kinds of 
virtualization software can be used to deploy virtual 
honeypots, such as VMware, Xen, Honeyd, etc. In 
our development tool, Honeyd and VNX are elected 
as the frameworks to deploy low-interaction 
honeypots and high-interaction honeypots. 
Honeyd is a low-interaction honeypot 
production, which can emulate distributed honeypots 
and services. However, there are many stand-alone 
honeypots need a distributed deployment tool to 
hold and deploy them. On the other hand, high-
interaction virtual honeypot also needs guest 
operating system and virtual machine as the 
deployment carrier to contain it. In our 
implementation, VNX is employed to provide guest 
virtual machine and virtual network for the high-
interaction honeypots and the stand-alone low-
interaction honeypots. VNX uses qcow2 format file 
system to startup the virtual machine. The services 
can be installed on the root file system previously. 
Besides, honeypot deployment tool should have 
the capability for reconfiguring the scenario on the 
fly. Honeyd has a doorway called Honeydctl to 
communicate the inner workings of Honeyd. 
Honeydctl can be used to reconfigure the templates 
on the fly. All commands used in the regular 
configuration file of Honeyd template are supported 
after “honeydctl>”, however, this is also the 
shortcoming of Honeydctl. The user has to input the 
commands interactively, but instead of interactively 
interacting with Honeydctl, an automatic capability 
of reconfiguration is desired. In fact, the author of 
Honeyd leaves us a UNIX socket located in 
/var/run/honeyd.sock. Using this socket, we can 
create a client socket to communicate with the inner 
workings of Honeyd, in other words, we can 
reconfigure the Honeyd templates by the client 
socket with a script that consists of Honeyd 
commands. 
On the other hand, the author of VNX developed 
the dynamic configuration capability. The user only 
needs to write a reconfiguration file based on XML 
syntax, later he can use VNX to automatically 
reconfigure the scenario by processing the 
reconfiguration file. 
4 IMPLEMENTATION 
In this section, our HoneyGen is validated by 
employing Honeyd and VNX to deploy honeynet. 
4.1 Validation 
The validation experiment is outlined in Figure 4. 
Both Honeyd and VNX were validated to be able to 
deploy the different scenarios based on the 
transformation modules. The average transformation 
time is less than 1s, which is very quick. It is not 
necessary to manually make the honeynet scenario, 
only needs to send a primitive request, and then the 
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honeypot deployment will be done. After 
deployment, the user can reconfigure the scenario in 
term of requirements, and it is very convenient. 
Besides, the users can also customize their own 
honeynet template and store them in the repository.  
Practically, due to the benefits of the 
technologies of VLAN and Open vSwitch (OVS), 
we can add the virtual honeypots into any target 
network. Figure 4 also shows the way to tag 
different virtual honeypots into different production 
networks. The VM1 is tagged on the internal 
network while the VM2 and VM3 are integrated into 
the DMZ network. 
 
Figure 4: Validation experiment setup. 
In addition, several root file systems of 
honeypots were customized by us for different use 
cases. Table 3 shows the customized root file 
systems of honeypots with the functions. 
By using these customized file systems of 
honeypots. Our tool implemented several use cases. 
The first one was the typical honeynet as figure 1 
illustrated, where the containment gateway is the 
Honeywall. The second use case, we deployed a 
KVM based cuckoo sandbox 
(http://www.cuckoosandbox.org/), which is used to 
analyze the malware and untrusted program as a 
client honeypot. In the third case, we deployed a 
scenario which contained a number of Ubuntu LXC-
based file systems, which are used to investigate 
different network intrusions. The TIHDL can 
describe all of these use cases. 
Table 3: The file systems of honeypots. 
OS Honeypot Function 
Roo 1.4 Honeywall  ContainmentGateway 
WinXP pro 
sp2 
Honeybot Capture and interact 
unsolicited traffic 






REMnux 5 Reverse-Engineering 






Trap malware and 
web attacking, 
keystroke record 
4.2 Performance Evaluation 
VNX can deploy virtual machine based on KVM or 
LXC. In the case of virtual machine based on KVM, 
VNX can emulate various operating systems. Thus, 
we can use KVM based virtual machine to deploy 
high-interaction honeypots on demand. The problem 
of this method is the performance. One example is 
demonstrated in Fig.5. It costs 40.02s to start up one 
KVM based virtual honeypot in our host. We also 
found that after the honeypot switching on, the cost 
of virtual memory descended to 726MB. However, 
the physical memory used situation is quite stable 
after16.87s, it maintained on more or less 160MB, 
and at the end it stayed on 206MB. 
 
Figure 5: Performance test for one KVM-based VM. 
On the other hand, the virtual machine based on 
LXC only can emulate the Linux operation system 
that uses the same Linux kernel with the host. Thus, 
this method lacks fidelity, but it has a high 
performance even under a large-scale deployment. 
As far as we know, several low-interaction honeypot 
productions, such as Dionaea 
(http://dionaea.carnivore.it/) and Glastopf 
(http://glastopf.org/) are stand-alone honeypot 
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productions. So we install them in the file system of 
the LXC-based virtual machine. After that, we can 
quickly and largely deploy the distributed LXC-
based virtual honeypots. 
For evaluation of the proposed development tool 
VNX, we recorded the performance data when we 
implemented the deployment. The system 
parameters of the host node were: CPU, 4 Intel(R) 
Core(TM) i5-3470 CPU @ 3.20GHz; RAM, 16GB; 
OS, Ubuntu 13.10; Kernel, Linux 3.11.0-26-generic. 
We took five parameters into account to evaluate the 
performance: RES (Physical memory used from the 
process), VIRT (Virtual memory used by the 
process), %CPU (The percentage of CPU used by 
the process), %MEM (The percentage of RAM used 
by the process), TIME+ (The total time of active of 
this process). 
We deployed 10 honeypots on a DMZ subnet 
alongside a target network. The host system 
launched 10 processes, and each process 
corresponding to each honeypots. We recorded the 
largest value among these 10 processes with those 
five parameters, and the results were: TIME+, 1:08; 
RES, 206m; VIRT, 864m; %CPU, 118; %MEM 1.3. 
The total time for starting up 10 honeypots is less 
than 5 minutes. But it is a long delay for intrusion 
traffic redirection into the honeypots. Thus, it is 
better to keep the high-interaction honeypots 
running when the redirected intrusion traffics come. 
Nevertheless, when we deployed ten LXC-based 
virtual honeypots, the values of these five 
parameters were: TIME+, 0:00.68; RES, 37m; 
VIRT, 168m; %CPU, 22.5; %MEM, 0.2. Form this 
result, we found that the startup delay of LCX-based 
virtual honeypots was very short, less than 1 second 
for 10 virtual honeypots to boot up, and the resource 
occupation was also quite little. So, if the fidelity of 
the virtual honeynet is not the most important 
consideration, for the large-scale virtual honeypots 
deployment and immediate intrusion response by 
interesting traffics redirection, the LXC-based 
virtual honeypots is the better choice. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, a new approach for the creation and 
management of honeynets based on the use of a 
technology independent honeynet description 
language has been presented. The language is a CIM 
like flexible language designed to describe 
honeynets, with a simple syntax easy to understand. 
It takes into account the characteristics and the 
special requirements of Honeynets. Besides, a 
flexible virtual honeynet tool named HoneyGen that 
uses the specification language to create and modify 
honeynets has been developed as a tool to validate 
all the ideas presented. The results of the 
experiments made show that the HoneyGen can be 
used to quickly and flexibly deploy virtual 
Honeynets based on two different deployment 
platforms: VNX and Honeyd.  
For the future work, there are plans to extend the 
HoneyGen tool to other deployment platforms like 
cloud infrastructures management tools, to study the 
automatic model-driven based translation process 
and to employ this approach in some real security 
project and deploy the honeynet in some production 
network to investigate network intrusion.  
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